The intricate dance of international relations is often a complex interplay of national interests, strategic compulsions, and historical legacies. For India, navigating these geopolitical tides, particularly in its own neighbourhood, has been a journey marked by a steadfast commitment to strategic autonomy and self-reliance. This path becomes even more pronounced when viewed against the backdrop of the United States’ historical engagement in South Asia, an engagement that, from an Indian perspective, often appeared to tilt significantly towards Pakistan, sometimes seemingly at the expense of Indian security and regional stability.
The Cold War era undeniably cast a long shadow over US policy in the subcontinent. Pakistan, by aligning itself with Western military pacts like SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation) and CENTO (Central Treaty Organisation) in the 1950s, positioned itself as a frontline state against perceived communist expansion. This strategic alignment translated into substantial military and economic assistance from Washington. As former US Ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill, noted in his writings, reflecting on this period, “During the Cold War, the United States usually judged India as too close to the Soviet Union and too distant from America.” This perception often meant that Pakistan became the recipient of advanced American weaponry and consistent diplomatic backing, resources that India viewed with concern, given its own unresolved conflicts with Pakistan.
The supply of sophisticated military hardware to Pakistan, from F-86 Sabre jets and Patton tanks in the 1950s and 60s to F-16 fighter jets in the 1980s (during the Soviet-Afghan War), was a recurring point of friction. While the US stated these were for defence against communism, India repeatedly voiced concerns that such weaponry would invariably be, and often was, deployed against it. The 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pak wars saw American-supplied arms used extensively by Pakistan. During the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War, the Nixon administration’s infamous “tilt” towards Pakistan, including the dispatch of the USS Enterprise aircraft carrier to the Bay of Bengal, was perceived in India as a direct attempt to intimidate a nation acting against a genocide. Henry Kissinger, then US National Security Advisor, justified this by citing the need to preserve Pakistan’s integrity as a key ally and a channel to China, but for India, it underscored a fundamental divergence in strategic priorities.
Beyond military aid, the economic trajectories of India and Pakistan, and their respective engagements with international financial institutions, offer a stark contrast. India, since its independence, has largely pursued a path of planned economic development with an emphasis on building indigenous capacity and minimising external debt dependence. While India has availed assistance from institutions like the World Bank and the IMF, it has generally done so with caution, often for specific developmental projects or to tide over temporary balance of payment crises, followed by robust repayment. For instance, India’s significant economic reforms in 1991 were accompanied by an IMF package, but the country was quick to stabilise and reduce its reliance. Historian and strategic analyst Ashley J. Tellis has observed that India, despite its developmental needs, has historically been “a reluctant aid recipient and a cautious borrower”.
Pakistan, on the other hand, has had a more frequent and sustained reliance on international bailouts, particularly from the IMF. Over the decades, Pakistan has approached the IMF over twenty times for financial assistance packages to address chronic fiscal and current account deficits, often linked to its high defence expenditure and structural economic weaknesses. While each nation’s economic choices are its own, the consistent pattern of bailouts for Pakistan, often facilitated or supported by US influence within these institutions, was sometimes viewed in India as indirectly subsidising a state whose policies were seen as detrimental to regional security. The argument was that such financial lifelines allowed Pakistan to maintain a level of military spending and foreign policy adventurism it might otherwise not have afforded.
The post-9/11 era saw another phase of significant US engagement with Pakistan, designating it a “Major Non-NATO Ally” due to its perceived crucial role in the “War on Terror”. This again led to substantial military and economic aid, despite growing concerns in India and internationally about Pakistan’s duplicitous role in harbouring extremist groups. While US officials often spoke of the complexities of managing the relationship with Islamabad, for India, the continued support, even in the face of mounting evidence of Pakistan’s complicity, felt like a prioritisation of short-term counter-terrorism goals over long-term regional stability and Indian security concerns.
India’s journey has been one of building strength from within, making calibrated choices on the international stage, and prioritising its own long-term security and economic sovereignty. While the past cannot be erased, India’s focus remains on forging a future where its destiny is shaped by its own hands, navigating the complexities of global politics with the confidence that comes from internal strength and a principled stand. The path of self-reliance, though often more arduous, ultimately leads to a more secure and dignified place in the comity of nations.
