Supreme Court: Bribery Conviction Doesn’t Require Act’s Performance

Supreme Court states bribery offense complete upon acceptance, not contingent on promised act, overturning legislative immunity in bribery cases under Articles 105 or 194.

Supreme Court of India

The Aryavarth Express
Agency(New Delhi): In a pivotal ruling, the Supreme Court has clarified that the crime of bribery is constituted at the moment of accepting illicit gratification, irrespective of whether the act promised in exchange for the bribe is actually carried out. This significant observation came from a seven-judge Constitution Bench of the Court, which was revisiting the precedent set by the 1998 PV Narasimha Rao v. State (CBI/SPE) judgment that had previously granted legislators immunity for bribery related to their legislative actions.

Led by the Chief Justice of India, the bench addressed the issue by stating that the offense of bribery is finalized once the bribe is accepted or once an agreement to accept the bribe is made. This position marks a departure from the earlier stance where immunity was provided for actions taken as a result of accepting a bribe, labeling the PV Narasimha Rao judgment’s approach as “paradoxical.”

The Court emphasized that the essence of the bribery offense lies in the mere act of accepting or agreeing to accept an undue advantage, making it clear that the actual performance of the promised act is not necessary for the offense to be considered complete. Citing Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the judgment explained that obtaining, accepting, or even attempting to obtain an undue advantage, with the intention to act or refrain from acting in a certain manner, is enough to constitute the offense. This interpretation is further supported by the provision’s first explanation, which states that the act of obtaining or attempting to obtain an undue advantage itself constitutes an offense, regardless of the performance of the public duty involved.

The Court also addressed a hypothetical scenario involving the exchange of a bribe within the legislature’s precincts, stating that such a situation does not affect the independence of the offense from legislative actions like voting or speaking, which are protected under Articles 105(2) and 194(2) of the Constitution. It clarified that the offense of bribery, being complete upon the acceptance of an undue advantage, falls outside the scope of legislative privileges, as it does not depend on the actual conduct of the vote or speech within the legislative process.

This landmark judgment redefines the boundaries of legislative immunity in cases of bribery, emphasizing the fundamental principle that the offense of bribery is established through the act of acceptance itself, regardless of subsequent actions or inactions.

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