The Aryavarth Express
The lesson from the usages of Shahed-136 in recent conflict is not about a drone. It is about a doctrine.
Across recent conflicts, these loitering munitions have demonstrated something far more consequential than their technical specifications suggest, the ability of low-cost, scalable systems to disrupt high-value military architectures. What appears rudimentary on the surface is, in reality, a carefully aligned response to the changing logic of warfare.
India would do well to treat this not as a distant observation, but as an immediate strategic prompt.
The defining feature of systems like the Shahed-136 is not sophistication it is attritability. They are designed to be produced in large numbers, deployed with minimal cost, and used in ways that force the defender into unfavourable economic and operational trade-offs. When such systems begin targeting the sensing and coordination layers of air defence, the consequences multiply. A radar lost is not just an asset destroyed; it is a node of awareness erased.
This is where the real disruption lies.
India’s current air defence posture, like that of most nations, is optimized for high-speed, high-value threats fighter aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic trajectories. It is not yet fully aligned with the demands of persistent, low-cost, swarm-enabled threats. The result is a growing mismatch between the nature of the threat and the structure of the response.
Encouragingly, India is not starting from scratch. Several indigenous initiatives already point in the right direction.
The ALFA-S (Air-Launched Flexible Asset – Swarm) program, spearheaded by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, represents a significant step towards swarm-enabled offensive capability. Designed to deploy multiple autonomous drones from a single airborne platform, ALFA-S signals India’s recognition of distributed, networked warfare.
Similarly, Defence Research and Development Organisation has advanced work on loitering munitions, anti-drone systems, and electronic warfare suites, while also exploring directed energy weapons for cost-effective interception. These efforts are critical in addressing the economics of countering low-cost threats.
Equally important is the role of the iDEX (Innovations for Defence Excellence) ecosystem, led by Defence Innovation Organisation. Through iDEX challenges, a growing number of Indian startups are developing solutions in counter-UAS systems, swarm intelligence, AI-driven targeting, and electronic warfare. This decentralized innovation model is precisely what a rapidly evolving threat landscape demands.
Yet, these initiatives—while promising must now be scaled, integrated, and operationalized at speed.
The first requirement is a shift from capability demonstration to force integration. Programs like ALFA-S cannot remain limited to trials or niche deployments. They must be embedded into operational doctrine, with clear roles in both offensive and defensive scenarios.
Second, India must accelerate the development of a layered, adaptive air defence architecture. This includes:
Distributed sensor networks, combining active and passive detection systems
Mobile radar units to reduce predictability and survivability risks
Decoy emitters and deception frameworks to counter anti-radiation targeting
AI-driven command systems for real-time threat prioritization and response
Third, the country must address the cost asymmetry problem head-on. Intercepting a low-cost drone with a high-cost missile is not a sustainable model. Investment in directed energy weapons, electronic jamming, and low-cost kinetic interceptors must be prioritized to restore economic balance.
Fourth, electromagnetic resilience must become a core design principle. As drones evolve to detect and target emissions, emission control, spectrum management, and passive sensing will define survivability. This is not merely a technical adjustment—it is a doctrinal shift.
Fifth, India must pursue offensive parity with intent. Deterrence in the drone age will depend on the ability to impose reciprocal costs. Indigenous loitering munitions, swarm systems, and electronic attack capabilities must be developed not as supplementary tools, but as central elements of operational planning.
Finally, there is a need for institutional acceleration. Procurement cycles must be shortened, testing infrastructure expanded, and collaboration between the armed forces, DRDO, and private industry deepened. The iDEX model provides a strong foundation, but it must be complemented by faster transition from prototype to production.
The broader point is unmistakable. Warfare is moving towards systems that are distributed, autonomous, and economically scalable. Complexity alone is no longer a guarantee of effectiveness. In many cases, it is simplicity—applied at scale—that creates decisive advantage.
The Shahed-136 is not a benchmark India needs to match. It is a signal India must interpret.
The country has the technological base, the industrial ecosystem, and the strategic clarity to lead in this domain. What is required now is urgency in execution and coherence in doctrine.
The choice is not between old and new systems. It is between adapting early or adapting under duress.
India still has the advantage of time. It must use it wisely.
By Dr Shweta Singh
